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CASE SUMMARY
GEBHART v. GAUGHAN:
CLARIFYING THE HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION AS TO POST-PETITION
APPRECIATION
INTRODUCTION
Filing for bankruptcy is becoming increasingly popular for
debtors looking for a “fresh start” in their financial affairs. In fact, the
Administrative Office of the Courts reported over a million Chapter 7
bankruptcy petitions filed in the 2010 fiscal year, up nearly sixteen
percent from the 2009 fiscal year. 1 Chapter 7 bankruptcy, commonly
known as “liquidation” bankruptcy, is a powerful remedy for an
individual debtor because it releases the debtor from personal liability for
certain debts and prohibits creditors from taking action to collect
dischargeable debts. 2
A bankruptcy case is commenced on the date the debtor files his or
her petition. 3 Among other things, the debtor must include in the
petition a list of his or her assets, debts, and the specific exemptions
being claimed. 4 Once the petition is filed, all of the debtor’s legal and

1

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up Nearly 14 Percent over
Last Fiscal Year, U.S. COURTS (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-1108/Bankruptcy_Filings_Up_Nearly_14_Percent_over_Last_Fiscal_Year.aspx?CntPageID=1
(“Chapter 7 filings in FY 2010 totaled 1,146,511, up 15.9 percent from the 989,227 chapter 7 filings
in FY 2009.”).
2
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S.
COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011).
3
Id.
4
Id.
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equitable property interests become property of the bankruptcy estate. 5
To oversee the administrative process, the court appoints a trustee to
serve as a representative of the bankruptcy estate. 6 Section 704 of the
Bankruptcy Code lays out the duties of the trustee, which include
investigating the financial affairs of the debtor and reducing the property
of the estate to cash in order to distribute the proceeds to creditors. 7
Although most of a debtor’s property belongs to the bankruptcy
estate, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to keep certain “exempt
property” pursuant to section 522. 8 Under section 522, the debtor
generally will have the option to choose between the federal bankruptcy
scheme of exemptions or state-law exemptions of the state in which the
debtor is domiciled. 9 However, each state has the choice to opt out of
federal bankruptcy exemptions, causing the debtor to be reliant solely on
the exemptions provided by the state. 10 Unless a party in interest such as
a creditor or trustee objects to an exemption claimed by the debtor, the
property is deemed exempt. 11 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 4003(b), a trustee ordinarily has only 30
days after the meeting of creditors to contest a claimed exemption or the
right to include the exempt property in the bankruptcy estate is lost. 12
This is true even in an instance “where the debtor has no colorable basis
for claiming the exemption.” 13 However, in the United States Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Schwab v. Reilly, the Court held that a
trustee’s failure to object did not prevent the trustee from forcing a sale
of property that was worth more than the claimed exemption amount. 14
Nevertheless, Reilly left open the question whether a debtor should
be allowed to retain any post-petition increase in the fair market value of
the debtor’s residence if the debtor’s equity interest in the property at the
time of filing was below the allowable exemption amount. 15 Recently,
the Ninth Circuit addressed this very issue in Gebhart v. Gaughan, a case

5

11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
11 U.S.C.A. § 323(a) (Westlaw 2011).
7
11 U.S.C.A § 704(a) (Westlaw 2011); 13A-CS23 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
FORMS § CS23.21.
8
11 U.S.C.A § 522 (Westlaw 2011).
9
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (Westlaw 2011).
10
Klein v. Chappell (In re Chappell), 373 B.R. 73, 77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)).
11
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(l) (Westlaw 2011).
12
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
13
Chappell, 373 B.R. at 77 (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992)).
14
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).
15
Id. at 2668 n.21
6
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that involved consolidated appeals. 16 In Gebhart, the value of the
debtors’ equity interest in their homes at the time of filing of each case
was less than the amount allowed under the homestead exemption. 17
However, in each case the value of the property increased substantially
after the date the petition was filed. 18 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held
that since the particular homestead exemptions involved in Gebhart
exempted only specific dollar amounts and not the entire properties, each
trustee was entitled to force a sale of the homestead property to collect
the increased post-petition value in the property despite the trustee’s
failure to object to the exemption within the 30-day time period
prescribed by Rule 4003(b). 19
This case summary begins by discussing the facts and procedural
history of the two consolidated appeals in Gebhart. Next, it outlines and
reviews the analysis of the Ninth Circuit. Lastly, it concludes by briefly
discussing the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart v. Gaughan was the result
of consolidated appeals in two bankruptcy cases involving the question
whether a trustee has a valid interest in the post-petition increases to a
homestead property’s fair market value. 20 While in the first case the
debtor claimed a homestead exemption under Arizona’s statutory
exemption laws, the second case applied the federal system of
exemptions. 21 In neither case did the trustee object to the claimed
exemption amount filed by the debtor(s) within the 30-day time limit set
by Rule 4003(b). 22
A.

THE GEBHART BANKRUPTCY

In an effort to obtain financial relief from his debts, Arizona
resident Nikalous Gebhart filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 8,
2003. 23 In Schedule C 24 of his bankruptcy petition, Gebhart claimed a
16

Gebhart v. Gaughan (In re Gebhart), 621 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1208.
18
Id.
19
Id at 1210.
20
Id. at 1208.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 1208-09.
23
Id. at 1208.
24
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, a debtor is required to include all the exemptions he or
she is claiming under Schedule C of the petition.
17
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homestead exemption in the amount of $89,703 for his residence located
in Phoenix, Arizona. 25 This value was determined by the difference, as
of the filing date, between the fair market value of the property
($210,000) and the mortgages encumbering the property ($120, 297). 26
After receiving his discharge on December 12, 2003, Gebhart
continued to live in his Phoenix home. 27 Under the impression that his
home was now exempt from the bankruptcy estate, Gebhart decided to
refinance his home. 28 The mortgage lender also believed that the
property was free and clear of any claims by the trustee of the
bankruptcy estate. 29 However, almost three years after the discharge of
Gebhart’s debts, the trustee asked the bankruptcy court for approval to
sell Gebhart’s home to recover the excess equity in the property for the
benefit of the creditors on the grounds that the property’s fair market
value had substantially increased subsequent to Gebhart’s filing of the
petition. 30
In his response, Gebhart asked the bankruptcy court to order the
trustee to abandon the property, based on the theory that the property was
now valueless to the bankruptcy estate. 31 In asserting that the homestead
property was valueless, Gebhart argued that for bankruptcy purposes, the
fair market value of the property is locked in at the time the bankruptcy
petition is filed. 32 In holding for the trustee, the bankruptcy court
allowed the trustee to force the sale of Gebhart’s residence. 33 Gebhart
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ruling of the bankruptcy
court. 34 Gebhart then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 35
B.

THE CHAPPELL BANKRUPTCY

On June 30, 2004 Steven and Julie Chappell filed a joint Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition in the state of Washington, which—unlike
Arizona—allows debtors to use the federal exemption system. 36 When a
couple files a joint petition, they are allowed to double the amount of
25

Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1208.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1208-09.
32
Id. at 1209.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
26
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their exemptions. 37 Thus, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), the
Chappells claimed a homestead exemption in the amount of $21,511.25,
which was the difference between the fair market value of the property
($350,000) and the liens encumbering the property ($328,488.75). 38
Similar to Gebhart, the Chappells continued living in their home
after receiving a bankruptcy discharge on October 21, 2004. 39 However,
during the two years following their discharge, the Chappells were
unable to keep up with their mortgage payments and defaulted. 40 The
mortgage lender then sought relief from the automatic stay in an effort to
foreclose on the property. 41 In response, the trustee of the bankruptcy
estate asked the court’s permission to sell the homestead property, as he
believed the fair market value of the property had increased by $200,000
from the date the petition was filed. 42
Ruling in favor of the Chappells, the bankruptcy court held that the
homestead property was no longer in reach of the trustee, because it had
been transferred entirely out of the bankruptcy estate at the time the
Chappells claimed their exemption in the property, and the trustee had
failed to object within the 30-day time period under Rule 4003(b). 43 The
bankruptcy court further held that the value of the exempt property was
determined at the time the petition was filed, thus no value remained in
the homestead property. 44 The trustee subsequently appealed to the
bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP), which reversed the bankruptcy
court’s decision and held in favor of the trustee. 45 The Chappells then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and their appeal was consolidated with
Gebhart’s appeal. 46
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s decision to affirm a
bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo, and all factual findings
by the bankruptcy court are reviewed for clear error. 47 This same
37

Id.; 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(m) (Westlaw 2011) (providing that the value of an exemption
“shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case”).
38
Klein v. Chappell (In re Chappell), 373 B.R. 73, 75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
39
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; Chappell, 373 B.R. at 75.
43
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209.
44
Chappell, 373 B.R. at 76.
45
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209.
46
Id.
47
Id. (citing Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Servs., Inc. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th
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standard of review is used by the Ninth Circuit when reviewing the
BAP’s decision to reverse a bankruptcy court’s decision. 48 To determine
whether a trustee is allowed to force a sale of a debtor’s home on the
basis that the property’s fair market value increased post-petition, the
Ninth Circuit panel in Gebhart spent the majority of its analysis on the
issue of whether a debtor’s entire homestead property is removed from
the bankruptcy estate as the result of a trustee’s failure to object to a
debtor’s claimed homestead exemption within the 30-day period
prescribed by Rule 4003(b). 49 The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue
of whether the value of the homestead property freezes, for bankruptcy
purposes, at the time the debtor files the bankruptcy petition. 50 While
ruling for the trustees on both issues, the Ninth Circuit left open the
possibility that estoppel may work as a potential remedy for debtors in
future bankruptcy cases. 51
A.

TRUSTEE’S FAILURE TO OBJECT DOES NOT REMOVE ENTIRE
PROPERTY FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

Writing for the Ninth Circuit panel, Circuit Judge Tashima noted
that the central issue was whether a bankruptcy trustee’s failure to timely
object to a claimed homestead exemption effectively removes the entire
Under Rule 4003(b), a
property from the bankruptcy estate. 52
bankruptcy trustee has 30 days after the meeting of creditors to object to
a debtor’s claimed exemption. 53 If an objection is not made within this
time period, the trustee waives the right to object to the claimed
exemption in the future. 54
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the United States Supreme Court’s
ruling in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz that a trustee is barred from
contesting the validity of a debtor’s claimed exemption after the 30-day
time period has passed, even if the debtor has no good-faith claim to the

Cir. 2002)).
48
Id. (citing Sigma Micro Corp v. Healthcentral.com (In re Healthcentral.com), 504 F.3d
775, 783 (9th Cir. 2007)).
49
Id. at 1209.
50
Id. at 1211.
51
Id. at 1212.
52
Id. at 1209.
53
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1) (providing “a party in interest may file an objection to the
list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors
held under § 341(a) is concluded or within 30 days after any amendment to the list or supplemental
schedules is filed” unless court “extend[s] the time for filing objections”).
54
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1).
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exemption. 55 The court of appeals further noted several other cases that
held that once a debtor’s property is deemed exempt, it is no longer
included in the bankruptcy estate; rather, it revests in the debtor. 56 The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this conclusion is supported by
language in the Bankruptcy Code that characterizes exempt property as
belonging to the debtor and thus outside of the bankruptcy estate. 57
However, the Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis there; the court went
on to discuss the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Schwab v. Reilly as it relates to the issue presented in Gebhart. 58
In Reilly, the Supreme Court clarified its ruling in Taylor by stating
that the value of the debtor’s property interest in a claimed exemption is
limited to the specific dollar amount allowable under that particular
exemption. 59 In summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Reilly,
Judge Tashima stated that “[e]ven when a debtor claims an exemption in
an amount that is equal to the full value of the property as stated in the
petition and the trustee fails to object, the asset itself remains in the
estate, at least if its value at the time of filing is in fact higher than the
exemption amount.” 60 Thus, all that is transferred out of the bankruptcy
estate is the specific dollar value of the debtor’s claimed exemption,
rather than the property itself. 61
Gebhart argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly applied
only to the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme and therefore was
inapplicable to his case since Arizona is one of the states that have opted
out of the federal bankruptcy exemption system. 62 In making this
argument, Gebhart relied on a 1983 case from the Arizona Court of
Appeals that stated that Arizona’s homestead exemption allowed the
debtor’s entire property to be removed from the bankruptcy estate, rather
than the specific dollar value of the debtor’s claimed exemption at the
time of filing. 63 However, the Ninth Circuit immediately rejected
Gebhart’s argument, noting that the case Gebhart had relied upon was
“decided based on an earlier version of the Arizona homestead statute,
which exempted ‘real property’ whereas the current version of the statute
55

Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1209; see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 (citing Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991); Smith v.
Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 2000); Bell v. Bell (In re Bell), 225 F.3d 203,
216 (2d Cir. 2000)).
57
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210; see 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(1) (Westlaw 2011).
58
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210; Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).
59
Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652.
60
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 (citing Reilly, 130 S. Ct. at 2661-62, 2666).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1210 n.5.
63
Id.; Evans v. Young, 661 P.2d 1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
56
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exempts an ‘interest in real property.’” 64 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that since Arizona’s homestead exemption is similar to the
federal exemption statute in that they both limit the specific dollar
amount a debtor may claim under the homestead exemption, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Reilly applies to all exemption statutes
that provide a dollar-value limit, including Arizona’s homestead
exemption. 65
The Ninth Circuit did recognize that the Supreme Court in Reilly
left open the question whether an entire property can be transferred to the
debtor when at the time of filing, the full fair market value of the
property is equal to or lesser than the maximum dollar amount allowed
for the exemption. 66 However, the Ninth Circuit never reached this
question since in Gebhart the value of the debtors’ claimed homestead
exemptions did not represent the full value of their properties—and only
their equity interests in the properties were claimed as exempt. 67 Thus,
this issue remains open.
The Ninth Circuit identified the factual differences between Reilly
and Gebhart, noting that in Reilly “the debtor underestimated the value
of the exempt property at the time of filing,” while in Gebhart “the
debtors accurately valued the equity interests in their homestead
properties at the time of filing, but the fair market values of the
properties increased subsequent to filing.” 68 However, the court did not
find the differences significant enough to change its analysis of the
issue. 69 Therefore, since the Supreme Court held in Reilly that the
debtor’s interest in the property is limited to the dollar value of the
claimed exemption, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “any additional
value in the property remains the property of the estate, regardless of
whether the extra value was present at the time of filing or whether the
property increased in value after filing.” 70 However, the court explained
its interpretation of Reilly may be limited to circumstances where the fair
market value of the property—and not just the debtor’s equity interest in
the property—is greater than the maximum exemption amount a debtor is
allowed to claim. 71
64

Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1210 n.5 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1101(A); other citation

omitted).
65

Id.
Id. at 1210 n.4 (citing Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. at 2668 n.21).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1211.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
66
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FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY DOES NOT
“FREEZE” AT THE TIME THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION IS FILED

The debtors argued that the trustees no longer had valid claims to
their properties, since the fair market value of their properties had
effectively been frozen at the time of filing the petitions, and any
conclusion to the contrary would be inconsistent with section 522(a)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 72 Section 522(a)(2) states that “‘value’ [of
property sought to be exempt] means fair market value as of the date of
the filing of the petition or, with respect to property that becomes
property of the estate after such date, as of the date such property
becomes property of the estate.” 73 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
debtors’ interpretation of section 522(a)(2), noting that it was
inconsistent with prior Ninth Circuit decisions, which had interpreted the
statute as freezing the value of the debtor’s claimed exemption at the date
the petition is filed, rather than freezing the fair market value of the
property. 74
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted past cases that had held that
the bankruptcy estate is entitled to post-petition increases in the value of
property even when a portion of the property is otherwise exempt. 75
Here, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that even though the prior cases dealt
with California’s scheme of exemptions, the holdings were applicable to
the present case since the Supreme Court reaffirmed that these
fundamental principles applied to all exemption statutes that limit the
dollar value of property claimed as an exemption. 76 Furthermore, the
decisions of these past cases were based not only on state law, but also
on section 541(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that
“[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of
the estate” is included as property of the estate. 77
C.

THEORY OF ESTOPPEL AS A POTENTIAL REMEDY

As a final argument, Gebhart asserted that even if the property is
deemed to be property of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee should be
72

Id.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2)).
74
Id.; see Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992).
75
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1211; see Alsberg v. Robertson (In re Alsberg), 68 F.3d 312, 314-15
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Hyman, 967 F.2d at 1321; Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 940 F.2d 1317,
1323 (9th Cir. 1991); Viet Vu v. Kendall (In re Viet Vu), 245 B.R. 644, 647-48 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2000).
76
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1211.
77
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see also Reed, 940 F.2d at 1323; Viet Vu, 245 B.R. at 649.
73
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estopped from forcing a sale of the property since the Trustee
deliberately left the bankruptcy case open longer than necessary. 78
However, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether
estoppel might be available as a remedy in a bankruptcy proceeding,
because in any event Gebhart would not have been able to establish the
elements required for estoppel to apply. 79 Thus, the Ninth Circuit left
open the possibility that estoppel might be a potential remedy in future
cases.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
In Gebhart, the debtors argued and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the
decision will lead to uncertainty as to the status of exempt property, even
when the bankruptcy trustee fails to object to a debtor’s exemption
within the 30-day time period. 80 In fact, Judge Tashima expressly stated
that a “Chapter 7 debtor will not be certain about the status of a
homestead property until the case is closed (something that may not
happen for several years after bankruptcy filing) or the trustee abandons
the property.” 81 Consequently, bankruptcy courts may see an increase in
debtors seeking orders to compel trustees to abandon property, as that
may be their only option to obtain certainty over the status of their
exempt property. 82
Additionally, since Gebhart entitled the bankruptcy trustee to the
post-petition increase in value of property that at the time of filing was
fully exempt, a bankruptcy trustee may be more prone to keep cases open
longer than necessary in the hope of acquiring additional assets for the
benefit of creditors. While the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] trustee has a
duty under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) to administer the case quickly and
expeditiously,” in Gebhart the bankruptcy cases had remained open for
two and three years subsequent to the debtors receiving discharge of their
debts. 83 Thus, as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gebhart,
78

Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1212.
Id. (“The following four elements are required in order for estoppel to apply: ‘(1) The
party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter
must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury’”
(quoting Bob’s Big Boy Family Rests. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1980).
80
Id. at 1211.
81
Id. at 1212.
82
A debtor may petition the bankruptcy court to “order the trustee to abandon any property
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 554(b) (Westlaw 2011).
83
Gebhart, 621 F.3d at 1212.
79
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abuses by the bankruptcy trustee may be more common as there is now
an incentive to keep bankruptcy cases open.
CONCLUSION
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly, the
Ninth Circuit held in Gebhart that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee may
force a sale of a debtor’s homestead property that at the time of the filing
was fully exempt, in order to realize equity in the property’s increase in
value above the debtor’s claimed exemptions. It determined that a
trustee’s failure to object to a debtor’s claimed exemption within the 30day time period prescribed under Rule 4003(b) only removes an
“interest” in the property from the bankruptcy estate equivalent to the
specific dollar value claimed by the debtor at the time of filing; therefore,
the property itself remains in the bankruptcy estate. 84 As a result of
Gebhart, debtors will be unclear as to the status of their property until
either the trustee abandons the property or the bankruptcy case is closed,
which might not occur until several months or even years after the
petition is filed. Furthermore, in allowing the trustees to collect the postpetition appreciation value in the debtors’ homestead properties, the
Ninth Circuit provided bankruptcy trustees an incentive to keep cases
open longer than necessary, in hopes of collecting additional money for
the creditors.

NATALIE R. BARKER*

84

Id. at 1210 n.4. The court did not address “instances in which the full value of the
property at the time of filing is in fact equal to or less than the monetary limit provided for by the
relevant bankruptcy exemption . . . because the debtors here claimed as exempt only their equity
interest in their properties . . ., not the full fair market value of their properties.” Thus, the court “left
open whether such a claim would entitle a debtor to the property itself as opposed to a payment
equal to the property’s full value.” Id.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California;
B.A. Psychology & Social Behavior and Criminology Law & Society, 2005, University of California
at Irvine, Irvine, California.
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